The herd moves? Emergence and self-organization in collective actors?

The puzzle about collective actors is in the focus of this contribution. The first section enters into the question of the adequateness and inadequateness of reductionist explanations for the description of entities. The considerations in this part do not draw on systems and hence not on principles of self-organisation, because this concept necessitates a systemic view. In other words, the first section discusses reductionism and holism on a very general level. The scope of these arguments goes far beyond self-organising systems. Pragmatically, these arguments will be discussed within the domain of corporative actors. Emergence is a concept embedded in system theory. Therefore, in the second part the previous general considerations about holism are integrated with respect to the concept “emergence”. In order to close the argument by exactly characterising self-organising systems and giving the conceptual link between self-organisation and emergence – which is done in the section four – the third section generally conceptualises systems. This conceptualisation is independent of whether these systems are self-organising or not. Feedback loops are specified as an essential component of systems. They establish the essential precondition of system-theoretic models where causes may also be effects and vice versa. System-theory is essential for dynamic models like ecological models and network thinking. In the fourth part mathematical chaos-theory bridges the gap between the presentation of systems in general and the constricted consideration of self-organising systems. The capability to behave or react chaotically is a necessary precondition of self-organisation. Nevertheless, there are striking differences in the answers given from theories of self-organisation in biology, economics or sociology on the question “What makes the whole more than the sum of its parts?” The fracture seems particularly salient at the borderline between formal-mathematical sciences like natural sciences including economy and other social sciences like sociology, for instance in the understanding and conceptualisation of “chaos” or “complexity”. Sometimes it creates the impression that originally well defined concepts from mathematics and natural science are metaphorically used in social sciences. This is a further reason why this paper concentrates on conceptualisations of self-organisation from natural sciences. The fifth part integrates the arguments from a system-theoretic point of view given in the three previous sections with respect to collective and corporative actors. Due to his prominence all five sections sometimes deal with the sociological system theory by Niklas Luhmann, especially in those parts with rigorous and important differences between his conception and the view given in this text. Despite Luhmann’s undoubted prominence in sociology, the present text strives for a more analytical and formal understanding of social systems and tries to find a base for another methodological approach.

Environmental dilemmas revisited: structural consequences from the angle of institutional ergonomics

The structure of a social dilemma lies behind many environmental problems. Mingling temporal aspects of resources with the structure of the social dilemma often leads to wrong conclusions. Therefore, it is worth analytically separating temporal aspects from structural aspects of the dilemma. This article concentrates solely on the structural aspects of the dilemma and the grades of complexity with respect to the number and stakes of the people involved, as well as the asymmetry of endowments and the salience of the optimal use of the resource in order to come close to the welfare optimum. Dilemmas with sufficient complexity are extremely vulnerable to individual defectors, and therefore institutions are necessary for the solution of the dilemma. Consequently, research in environmental psychology should not only target the individuals, but focus on institutional design with respect to (1) the structural diagnosis of environmental dilemmas; (2) methods that provide an insight into the structural problem of environmental dilemmas; (3) the impact of institutions on internalizing norms; and (4) the impact of structural knowledge about the dilemma of accepting institutions that help to solve the environmental dilemma. In analogy to software-ergonomics, psychology should initiate research in institutional ergonomics that helps to create addressee-friendly institutions.

Is there an optimization in bounded rationality? The ratio of aspiration levels

Simon’s (1955) famous paper was one of the first to cast doubt on the validity of rational choice theory; it has been supplemented by many more papers in the last three and a half decades. Nevertheless, rational choice theory plays a crucial role in classical and neoclassical economic theory, which presumes a completely rational agent. The central points characterizing such an agent are: (1) The agent uses all the information that is given to him. (2) The agent has clear preferences with respect to the results of different actions. (3) The agent has adequate competences to optimize his decisions. As an alternative to this conception, Simon (1955) himself suggests the concept of “bounded rationality”. In this context, Simon (1956) discusses a principle, which he names the “satisficing principle” (for explanations with respect to this notion cf. Gigerenzer & Todd 1999, p. 13). It assumes that, instead of searching for an optimal action, the search for an action terminates if an alternative has been found that satisfies a given “aspiration level”. It will be demonstrated that although the satisficing principle is nothing but a heuristic, there is a mathematical optimization at work when aspiration levels are used in this kind of problems. The question about the optimal aspiration level can be posed. Optimization within the framework of bounded rationality is possible. However, the way in which such an optimization can be achieved is very simple: Optimal thresholds in binary sequential decisions rest with the median.

Playing strategically against nature? – Decisions viewed from a game-theoretic frame

Common research on decision-making investigates non-interdependent situations, i.e., “games against nature”. However, humans are social beings and many decisions are made in social settings, where they mutually influence each other, i.e., “strategic games”. Mathematical game theory gives a benchmark for rational decisions in such situations. The strategic character makes psychological decision-making more complex by introducing the outcomes for others as an additional attribute of that situation; it also broadens the field for potential coordination and cooperation problems. From an evolutionary point of view, behavior in strategic situations was at a competitive edge. This paper demonstrates that even in games against nature, people sometimes decide as if they were in a strategic game; it outlines theoretical and empirical consequences of such a shift of the frame. It examines whether some irrationalities of human decision-making might be explained by such a shift in grasping the situation. It concludes that the mixed strategies in games against nature demand a high expertise and can only be found in situations where these strategies improve the effects of minimax-strategies that are used in cases of risk-aversion.

Giving or Taking: The Role of Dispositional Power Motivation and Positive Affect in Profit Maximization?

Socio-economic decisions are commonly explained by rational cost vs. benefit considerations, whereas person variables have not usually been considered. The present study aims at investigating the degree to which dispositional power motivation and affective states predict socio-economic decisions. The power motive was assessed both indirectly and directly using a TAT-like picture test and a power motive self-report, respectively. After nine months, 62 students completed an affect rating and performed on a money allocation task (Social Values Questionnaire). We hypothesized and confirmed that dispositional power should be associated with a tendency to maximize one’s profit but to care less about another party’s profit. Additionally, positive affect showed effects in the same direction. The results are discussed with respect to a motivational approach explaining socio-economic behaviour.economic decision-making, rational choice theory, personality, implicit power motive, positive affect, operant motive test

Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games

We experimentally study the effect of asymmetry on cooperation in a 40 period prisoner's dilemma game in fixed partner design. We distinguish between a high and low payoff symmetric prisoner's dilemma and an asymmetric game combined out of both symmetric ones. Asymmetry significantly decreases cooperation, as low-type players are more likely to defect after mutual cooperation while high-type players initiate cooperation more often than the former. Asymmetry also has a significant negative effect on the stability of cooperation rendering long sequences of mutual cooperation extremely rare.Symmetry, Asymmetry, Prisoner's Dilemma, Experiments

Zug um Zug die Effizienz steigern

Hinter einer Reihe von Umweltproblemen steht eine Gemeingut-Problematik. Die Sozialpsychologie zeigt, wie Menschen mit den entstehenden Dilemmata umge­hen. Besondere Bedeutung für kooperative Lösungen haben soziale Wertorientie­rungen, Sanktionen und Kontrollen sowie geeignete Reaktionsstrategien

First Impressions are More Important than Early Intervention Qualifying Broken Windows Theory in the Lab

Broken Windows: the metaphor has changed New York and Los Angeles. Yet it is far from undisputed whether the broken windows policy was causal for reducing crime. In a series of lab experiments we put two components of the theory to the test. We show that first impressions and early punishment of antisocial behaviour are independently and jointly causal for cooperativeness. The effect of good first impressions and of early vigilance cannot be explained with, but adds to, participants’ initial level of benevolence. Mere impression management is not strong enough to maintain cooperation. Cooperation stabilizes if good first impressions are combined with some risk of sanctions. Yet if we control for first impressions, early vigilance only has a small effect. The effect vanishes over time.